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correlated with house prices and not correlated with occupation-wage mobility, suggesting that 
geographical comparisons based on one dimension of mobility need not always align with those based on 
alternative measures. 
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11. Introduction
There is copious evidence showing life chances are affected by family background. 
Children whose parents went to university are themselves more likely to do so, they are more 
likely to be higher earners if their parents were, and it is the same story for home ownership.1 
What is far less clear, and for which there is almost no evidence for the UK, is whether the role 
of family background is attenuated or enhanced by the locality in which you grow up. In other 
words, is the link between child and parental university attendance the same in Liverpool as in 
Lambeth? If you father was a low-skilled worker does the probability that you become a high-
skilled professional depend on whether you grew up in Oldham or Oxford? Such questions are 
both intrinsically interesting for academic research and at the same time crucial for policy. 
Much of the existing evidence on intergenerational mobility in the UK focusses on 
small longitudinal studies that follow a group of people born in the same week in a particular 
year. These cohort studies tend to be infrequent, suffer from significant attrition over time and 
do not provide a large enough sample to provide estimates at anything other than the aggregate 
national level. There are some reported estimates of social mobility at a more disaggregated 
level, but in general these do not directly measure mobility. For example, the Social Mobility 
Commission publishes an annual report that provides estimates of a social mobility index. Part 
of this index follows children who receive government-provided free school meals at school 
and examines their educational outcomes. To the extent that free school meals are a measure 
of parental disadvantage, this goes some way to measuring mobility. However, the other 
components of the index focus on wages, employment, occupation and home ownership in an 
area for all adults, irrespective of background. In other words, they measure the economic 
outcomes of an area rather than the mobility experienced by individuals in that area. As 
acknowledged in Social Mobility Commission (2017), this is a limited proxy of spatial 
differences in intergenerational mobility. 
By using linked decennial census data contained in the Longitudinal Study of England 
and Wales (LS), we are able to make significant progress on measuring geographic levels and 
trends of intergenerational mobility.2 The LS data are a 1% cohort sample from the decennial 
census. They can be used to follow three cohorts of individuals born in 1955-61, 1965-71 and 
1
 For reviews of the economic literature on intergenerational mobility see Black and Devereux (2011), the vast 
sociology literature on social class is discussed in Bukoki and Goldthorpe (2018) and a more populist discussion 
is given in Elliot Major and Machin (2018).   
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 As the census is administered separately for Scotland and Northern Ireland, these areas are excluded from this 
dataset. As of 2015, these omitted countries constitute approximately 11% of the UK population. 
21975-81 over time. We can observe parental education, occupation and home ownership when 
the individual cohort members were aged 10-16 and living with their parents. We then examine 
the same outcomes for the cohort members when aged 30-36.  
This dataset therefore allows us to focus explicitly on intergenerational mobility rather 
than other demographics of an area that may – or may not – be correlated with mobility. And 
it allows us to focus on the geography of mobility because the sample sizes are an order of 
magnitude larger than the cohort data used in most previous studies, including the classic study 
of Blanden et al. (2004) which first drew attention to falling social mobility in Britain. By 
focusing on a range of outcomes we aim to develop a richer picture of the geography of 
intergenerational mobility. We show that there are some distinct geographic differences in the 
various measures.  
One potential drawback is that, unfortunately, the UK census does not record wages or 
income and so we are unable to use this common metric to measure intergenerational mobility. 
There is in fact no dataset in the UK that would ever be able to generate such estimates at the 
sub-national level, though the recent availability of computerised income tax records may open 
up the possibility of using such a measure in the future. On the upside, because we have three 
successive cohorts, we are able to provide estimates not just of the level of mobility but also 
changes over time. In addition, we are able to observe a much broader set of characteristics 
than those commonly available in tax return data.  
While the focus of this paper is on providing estimates of mobility at a sub-national 
level, we are also able to comment on national trends over time. Our analysis based on LS 
represents a significant improvement on previous evidence based on small surveys, hence we 
see these national estimates as a valuable additional contribution. Comparing the 1955-61 birth 
cohort against the 1975-81 cohort we find that occupation-wage mobility has slightly fallen, 
broadly consistent with the existing evidence based on small surveys. Home ownership 
mobility, broadly defined as the likelihood of owning a home if your parents did not own a 
home, has fallen dramatically, again consistent with existing evidence. In terms of education 
(degree) mobility, this period saw an explosive rise in higher education enrolment, which 
makes it difficult to make clear comparisons over time. Our analysis based on two different 
measures suggests that education mobility has risen according to odds-based measures, but has 
fallen according to coefficient-based measures. While the UK’s dramatic higher education 
expansion led to many more children of non-degree holders attending university, it also led to 
an increase in enrolment among those whose parents went to university. Overall, the percentage 
point gap in enrolment probabilities between the two groups actually increased, so in this sense 
3educational mobility fell. However in terms of the number of times more likely the children of 
degree holders are to attend university than the children of non-degree holders, educational 
mobility has risen. 
Our main analysis points to there being very substantial differences in the levels of 
mobility across England and Wales. Consider the cohort born in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
For this group, the probability that the child obtains a university degree if at least one of their 
parents had a degree was 79%, compared to 35% if neither parent had a degree. This is an 
attainment gap of 44% percentage points. But this gap ranged from 42% in the South East of 
England to 48% in Yorkshire and Humberside. At the even more granulated level, this 
attainment gap falls to 37% in Kent but is 53% in Inner East London. 
Similarly, if we focus on the probability of moving from the bottom tercile of the 
occupation distribution (ranked according to median wages within occupations) to the top 
tercile in a generation, the national transition probability for the same cohort is 22%. But this 
is as high as 30% for those growing up in London and only 17% for those in Yorkshire and 
Humberside. In terms of home ownership, for those whose parents owned a home, the 
probability of home ownership is 31 percentage points higher than it is for those whose parents 
are not homeowners. This gap ranges from 25 percentage points in Wales to 38 percentage 
points in London. 
Our data also allows us to test whether regional differences in mobility have increased 
over time. How has the dispersion of mobility changed over time across regions of England 
and Wales? Comparing the cohort born in the late 1950s and early 1960s to that born in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, we see that occupation-wage mobility gaps have widened, as have 
home ownership mobility gaps. The career prospects and chances of owning a home of those 
from different parental backgrounds for the latest cohort depends more on the region of birth 
than it did for those born in the mid 20th century. Regional education mobility gaps however 
have closed over this same time period. 
While the existence of variation across geographical areas is interesting in its own right, 
the real value of producing such estimates is that it allows us to start considering the causes, 
and implications of variation in intergenerational mobility. While a thorough analysis of the 
mechanisms leading to different levels of mobility is outside of the realms of this paper, we 
present correlations of our geographical estimates with several variables. Firstly, we 
demonstrate that the high occupation-wage mobility experienced by London is not part of a 
general trend of high mobility in cities. Whatever is driving the exceptional mobility of London 
is something particular about London rather than a broader urban-rural divide. Secondly, we 
4show that occupation-wage mobility is lowest in ex-industrial and mining areas. Third, we 
demonstrate that home ownership mobility is related to house prices, such that areas with 
higher house prices have lower rates of home ownership mobility. Finally, we show that areas 
experiencing low occupation-wage mobility were more likely to vote to leave the EU in the 
2016 referendum. 
This paper adds to the growing literature on the geography of opportunity spearheaded 
by the US administrative data work of Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez (2014). Chetty et al. 
use linked income tax records of more than 40 million children and their parents in the US to 
examine how intergenerational mobility varies across the country. They show, as we do for 
England and Wales, that there is substantial geographic variation in mobility across the US. 
For example, the probability that a child reaches the top quintile of the national income 
distribution starting from a family in the bottom quintile is 4.4% in Charlotte, North Carolina 
but 12.9% in San Jose, California. Additionally, they show that high mobility areas have less 
residential segregation, less income inequality, better primary schools, greater social capital 
and greater family stability.  
Tan (2018) has considered the Chetty et al. spatial estimates in an earlier time period, 
looking at Census data from the early 20th century in the United States. In a comparative context 
that is interesting and relevant for our analysis of changes over time in England and Wales, he 
finds that the geography of intergenerational mobility looked rather different in 1910 and 1940 
Census data.  Back then, mobility across generations was higher for those growing up in the 
industrial Midwest and the coastal areas of the US. This contrasts with the more recent spatial 
patterns in the Chetty et al. study. 
In subsequent work on the recent data, Chetty and Hendren (2018a, b) generate casual 
estimates of the impact of neighbourhoods on intergenerational mobility by exploiting family 
moves from one area to another that occur at different ages for different children within a 
family. Provided the selection effect inherent in moving areas is not correlated with the age of 
the child, this generates a causal estimate. They present evidence that supports the validity of 
this identification assumption. They also provide estimates of mobility at the county-level for 
the United States – 3,000 in total. These estimates reinforce the message of their original paper 
that mobility varies substantially across the country, but also highlights how it varies locally. 
For example, if a child moved at birth from Cook County (in the city of Chicago) to DuPage 
County (a western suburb 20 miles from Chicago), they would on average increase their 
income in adulthood by 30%. To our knowledge, there currently exist few other papers looking 
5at regional aspects of mobility. One exception is Heidrich (2017), who shows evidence of 
geographic variation in income mobility across Sweden. 
Focusing on educational attainment rather than income, Card, Domnisoru and Taylor 
(2018) use the 1940 census data to examine the intergenerational transmission of human capital 
for children born in the 1920s. They find lower average mobility rates for blacks than whites, 
but consistent with Chetty et al., wide variation across states and counties for both races. 
Perhaps the most striking result in their paper is the strong positive correlation between 
education mobility for the 1920s cohort and income mobility for the 1980-83 cohort as 
measured by Chetty et al. across the counties of the US. The correlation coefficient is 0.45, 
suggesting a high degree of persistence in local factors affecting intergenerational mobility in 
the US given that the two cohorts were born 60 years apart. 
2. Data
The main dataset is the Longitudinal Study of England and Wales (LS). The LS 
contains linked decennial census and life events data for a 1% sample of the population. It 
contains records on over 500,000 people at any point in time. Records have been linked at each 
census since the 1971 Census, for people born on one of four selected dates spread throughout 
the calendar year. These four dates were used to update the sample at the 1981, 1991, 2001 and 
2011 Censuses. Life events data are also linked for LS members, including births to sample 
mothers, deaths and cancer registrations via the National Health Service (NHS) number, a 
unique identifier held by almost all residents of England and Wales. New LS members enter 
the study through birth and immigration (if they are born on one of the four selected birth 
dates). 
Only LS members can be followed over time, not their extended family. However, in 
each census, data are provided on all individuals in the LS member’s household at the time of 
census enumeration. Importantly this means that to obtain data on parental outcomes we need 
to first observe the LS member at an age where they are living with their parents. We can then 
follow the LS member over subsequent years to observe their adult outcomes. Our core sample 
of cohorts are therefore those individuals aged 10-16 in the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses and 
who have at least one parent in the same household at this age. This corresponds to birth cohorts 
of 1955-1961, 1965-1971 and 1975-1981. In general, we measure the adult outcome for these 
cohorts two censuses after we first observe them. For example, the 1975-1981 birth cohort are 
first observed in 1991 aged 10-16. At this point we extract data on parental outcomes – the 
6median age of parents is 41. We then use the 2011 census to measure adult outcomes for the 
children who are at that point aged 30-36. We select this age range as it is plausible that by this 
point, for most individuals occupational maturity has been reached, and most housing and 
education decisions have been made. We acknowledge however that for housing, the ideal age 
at which to observe outcomes is possibly greater than that which is possible here. Summary 
statistics for each cohort are presented in Table 1.  
Our empirical analysis of intergenerational mobility focuses on three components: 
occupation, home ownership and education. As already noted, unlike studies such as Chetty et 
al. (2014), we do not directly observe individuals’ earnings in the census dataset. However, as 
earnings mobility patterns have been a topic of immense debate and policy interest, we 
integrate external data on wages into our analysis, producing a hybrid occupation-wage 
measure. The New Earnings Survey (NES), and later the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE), provide estimates of weekly wages for detailed 3-digit occupation classifications for 
the period required. These large surveys are thought to be the most reliable source of wage 
information in the UK. They are based on a 1% sample of UK workers and exclude the self-
employed. For the most recent ASHE, there are 494 different occupation codes. For each 
census, we assign each individual observed in LS the median weekly wage for their occupation 
from NES / ASHE. As will be discussed in the following section, we do not directly use this 
median weekly wage data in our analysis, instead using it to form rankings and quantiles on 
which we base our occupation-wage analysis. Due to low female labour-force participation in 
the early cohorts, we restrict our occupation-wage analysis to males. 
We prefer to think of this simply as a way of ranking occupations by their market price 
rather than trying to impute earnings to our cohort members (and their parents) since we know 
that occupation is only one component of an individual’s wage. However, cross-section wage 
regressions using Labour Force Survey data show that 3-digit occupation dummies individually 
explain 40% of the variation in wages compared to 15% for education, 2% for locality and 25% 
for industry. Therefore, it is plausible that geographical patterns in wage-ranked occupation 
measures are similar to those based on actual wage data. One advantage of our approach is that 
there have been three changes in occupation coding over our sample period. By simply 
allocating the median wage to each occupation we mitigate the problems involved in trying to 
generate consistent occupation codes across censuses. Composition changes in the labour 
market through time cause well-established and understood problems for studying trends in 
social mobility over time based upon social class measures derived from occupations. This is 
because of changes in job employment structure and because, as wage inequality has risen over 
7time in the UK, the distribution of wages has also widened within the social class groupings 
often used in such work. A detailed and very clear analysis of recent Labour Force Survey data 
by Friedman and Laurison (2016) makes this point clear, showing that studying social class 
mobility for broadly defined groups is misleading due to occupational shifts within the groups 
over time, as does the earnings analysis of Blanden, Gregg and MacMillan (2013).3    
Home ownership measures whether the individual owns their own home, rather than 
renting or living in public housing. We do not distinguish between whether the home is owned 
outright or with a mortgage, nor whether the property is freehold or leasehold. The education 
variable has changed across the census years and we are therefore restricted to focus only on 
whether the cohort member (and either of their parents) have at least a first degree or not. 
Fortunately, there is extensive evidence to show that this distinction is the most important in 
terms of the labour market benefits to educational attainment – the wage premium for a degree 
relative to leaving school at the compulsory school leaving age was 90% whilst the premium 
for an additional two years of schooling was only 24% according to calculations from the 
Labour Force Survey. In the case when we can match to only one parent, we look only at the 
home ownership status and educational attainment of that parent.  
The lowest-level consistent geographical information provided by LS is the local 
authority, of which there are currently 375 in England and Wales. Local authorities have 
merged and separated across our period of analysis but using records of these changes we are 
able to map each observation to its equivalent 2011 census local authority. Local authorities 
range in population size from several thousand (Isles of Scilly) to over a million (Birmingham). 
As many of these local authorities do not provide adequate sample sizes for meaningful 
analyses, we primarily use the European Union’s standard geographical classifications 
(NUTS), which are built on the lower-level local authorities. NUTS1, our highest level of 
analysis, is equivalent to the ten broad regions of England and Wales. We also perform analysis 
at the NUTS2 level, of which there are 35 in England and Wales, and the NUTS3 level, of 
which there are 145.4  
3
 See also the discussions of ‘big’ versus ‘small’ occupation measures and their usefulness or otherwise for 
studying social mobility, and especially for studying trends over time, in the work by Jonsson, Grusky, Di Carlo, 
Pollak and Brinton (2009). 
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 To give a sense of sample size, consider the 1975-81 cohort. As show in Table 1, we have data on 34,720 child-
parent observations in England and Wales. At the NUTS1 level, the smallest cell is 1,868 (North East) and the 
largest is 5,297 (South East). At the NUTS2 level, the smallest cell is 323 observations (Cornwall and Isles of 
Scilly) and the largest is 1,876 (West Midlands). At NUTS3, the smallest cell is Westminster with 20 observations 
and the largest is Birmingham with 695 observations. In our analysis using NUTS3 results we weight by number 
of observations to account for the imprecision of estimates based on small sample sizes. 
8Our main analysis is based on the geographical location of residence for individuals 
when they are 10-16. Importantly due to migration this will not necessarily be the area in which 
we observe their adult outcomes aged 30-36. In this paper we do not distinguish between 
‘movers’ and ‘non-movers’, although in future work we intend to explore this dimension. 
Though our core sample are the birth cohorts 1955-61, 1965-71 and 1975-81, we extend 
these samples when we present sub-national results to increase sample size. For occupation 
and education measures, we sample children aged 8-17, who are therefore 28-37 when 
subsequently observed in adulthood. This corresponds to birth cohorts 1954-63, 1964-73, and 
1974-83. For homeownership we maintain the core birth cohorts as homeownership tends to 
occur later in life than educational attainment and occupational choice, so we cannot justify 
extending the sample. In addition, the distribution of home ownership is such that power is less 
of a concern. To justify our sample extensions for the regional analyses, we demonstrate that 
our national results are essentially the same regardless of whether we use the core birth cohorts 
or the extended cohorts. 
Attrition is low, particularly when compared to cohort studies on which previous UK 
research on mobility are based.5 For our baseline 10-16 sample, in the 1971 cohort, we start 
with 53,809 individuals, 45,049 of whom are found at follow-up in 1991. When we restrict 
those matched to at least one parent in 1971, we are left with 42,907 individuals. Overall then, 
we retain 80% of our full initial sample. As the census is compulsory and has near-complete 
coverage, we therefore believe our results to be valid for the full population born in that period. 
For our 1981 cohort, the equivalent percentage is 76% and for the 1991 cohort it is also 76%. 
These high rates of follow-up are a key benefit to our study. 
3. Methods
In this section, we discuss how we exploit the data described above to generate 
measures of mobility across our three components. 
Intergenerational Mobility in Occupation 
These measures are based on the imputed occupational wage data. Each individual is 
assigned a percentile rank. This rank refers to their position in the national occupational wage 
distribution within their cohort. For example, a rank of 70 assigned to a father in the 1991 
census means that out of the fathers in our sample for that cohort, 70% of fathers work in 
5 While attrition is low on average, it is higher among groups such as younger men.
9occupations that paid a median wage less than this particular father’s occupation. As discussed 
previously, occupation-wage measures are based only on fathers and sons, due to low female 
participation rates in early cohorts. 
Using these percentile ranks, we focus on two measures of intergenerational mobility. 
First, we estimate transition matrices for the probability of moving across percentiles of the 
occupation distribution. We focus in particular on the probability of the cohort member rising 
from the bottom group (e.g. quartile) of the occupation distribution (based on the median wage 
of the parent’s occupation) to the top group (based on the median wage of the cohort members 
adult occupation). Higher values reflect more upward relative mobility at the national level. At 
the sub-national level, higher values for this measure reflect greater levels of upward absolute 
occupational wage mobility. An advantage of these transition matrices as opposed to those 
based on social class is that group proportions are by construction equal and unchanging over 
time. 
Second, we report the mean rank (in the national child occupation distribution) of 
children whose parents are at the 25th percentile of the national parent occupation distribution. 
This statistic is derived by regressing child occupation rank on parent occupation rank. Let  
denote child i’s percentile rank in the occupation distribution of children and  denote parent 
i’s percentile rank in the occupation distribution of parents. For the various cohorts under study 
(denoted by c), the regression model can be expressed as follows: 
 =   + 	 + 
 (1) 
This projection is performed separately for each cohort and geographical unit of 
interest. Ranks are always defined in relation to the national occupation-wage distribution.  The 
mean rank of children whose parents are at the 25th percentile is given by  +  25	 , where a 
hat denotes an estimate. Again, when estimated for sub-national areas, this measure can be 
thought of as reflecting absolute mobility rather than relative mobility, as the intercept will 
differ across areas. Differences are then driven by both the change in the overall occupational 
distribution for those born in an area and the relationship between parent and child occupations 
in an area. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these two measures. The first is non-
parametric, not involving any assumptions on the particular functional form of the relationship 
we seek to model. However, this comes at a cost of sample size. Even in the tercile mobility 
10 
case, we are discarding two thirds of our sample by building a measure based only on the lowest 
tercile. On the other hand, the second measure requires more parametric assumptions, but by 
making these assumptions we are able to leverage information from the entire sample. In our 
baseline results we present both measures and show the relationship between the two, but for 
low geographical disaggregation we tend to use the second in the interest of power and 
consistency with the recent literature. 
Intergenerational Mobility in Home Ownership & Education 
Home ownership and degree attainment are binary variables for both parent and child. 
We estimate cohort-specific linear probability models of the determinants of home ownership 
and possession of a university degree for individual i in cohort c: 


 =  + 

 + 	  + 
 (2) 
In (2), the cohort-specific intergenerational estimate conditional upon a set of control 
variables is given by  = !"
 = 1$

 = 1 $ %. Without
controls, this is simply the mean gap in home ownership or degree attainment. In our results, 
we refer to this as the ‘correlation’ measure, as it is a partial correlation. In our specifications, 
we control for child age, gender and ethnicity. Higher values of the coefficient correspond to 
lower mobility. We estimate these models separately for each geographical area of interest. 
As will be demonstrated in our results section, over time the levels of home ownership 
and degree attainment have changed across cohorts. The measure introduced above is only 
informative on the percentage point difference in the binary outcome between those of one 
parental status and another. It may be more pertinent to consider the log odds ratio – the (log 
of the) increased chance of being a home owner (degree recipient) if your parents were owners 























If child outcomes are unrelated to parent outcomes, the log odds ratio equals zero. 
Higher log odds ratios correspond to more (positive) association between parental outcomes 
and child outcomes, and hence reflect lower mobility. Again, as in the occupational wage case 
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there are arguments for each measure. Both measures are indicators of relative rather than 
absolute mobility. If parent group sizes are not particularly skewed, as will be shown to be true 
for home ownership, and controls are not particularly important, the two give broadly similar 
results. However, when groups are highly imbalanced, as will be shown for degrees, the two 
give different results. In this case, we argue that both measures have value and opt to discuss 
both in our analysis. 
4. Results
National Results 
We begin by showing aggregate results for our various measures of mobility and where 
possible compare them with extant estimates in the literature, both for Britain and for other 
countries. We then move on to the key focus of our paper – the geography of mobility. 
Table 2 reports the main results for all of England and Wales. Each panel represents a 
different outcome measure and across the columns we present estimates of mobility for each 
of our three cohorts. In the final column we estimate the change in the mobility measure from 
the first to the last cohort to give a sense as to whether mobility has been changing over our 
sample period. As discussed previously, to avoid issues related to the very substantial change 
in female labour force participation that has occurred over our sample period, the results for 
occupation relate only to boys and their fathers. The results for home ownership and degree 
attainment relate to both sexes for each generation, with controls for gender in the regression-
based measures. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports estimates for occupational mobility. The probability of 
moving from the bottom tercile of the occupational wage distribution to the top tercile within 
a generation was 0.259 for the cohort born in 1955-61. This probability falls over time i.e. 
occupational mobility declines and stood at 0.223 for the last cohort born in 1975-81. This drop 
of 0.036 is significant at the 1% level. For robustness, we also present estimates for other 
percentile groupings – quartile and quintile – and the pattern is very similar. The final row of 
Panel A presents estimates of the expected rank of the child conditional on the parent being at 
the 25th percentile. This also shows a decline in mobility, though the magnitude is small and 
the estimate is statistically insignificant. 
Previous studies of intergenerational mobility in the UK have focused on specific 
cohort studies that follow all children born in a particular week through their childhood and 
adult life. The two most studied datasets are the 1958 National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS). Our first two cohorts include these birth 
12 
years and so we can compare our results to published results from these studies. Two points 
should be borne in mind when comparing these studies to our own. First the NCDS and BCS 
are both small samples – the useable sample with information on both parents and children 
tends to be around 2,000 for each survey. This is the key reason why these commonly-used 
datasets cannot address questions of geographical variation in mobility. Second, the most-
recent equivalent cohort study (the Millennium Cohort Study) only began in 2000 and so does 
not yet provide any substantive evidence on intergenerational mobility. Our estimates therefore 
present a more up-to-date snapshot of mobility than is possible with cohort studies. 
Blanden and Machin (2008) report estimates for the probability of moving from the 
lowest quartile to the highest quartile based on parent and son’s income. For the 1958 cohort 
this is estimated to be 0.18 and falls to 0.13 in the 1970 cohort. This decline is more pronounced 
than that shown for occupational wages in Panel A of Table 1, where the bottom to top quartile 
transition drops from 0.19 to 0.18 – though note that the quintile transition drops more 
noticeably, from 0.145 to 0.125. In terms of cross-country comparisons, Chetty et al. (2014) 
report a value of 0.075 for the bottom-to-top quintile transition probability, whilst figures for 
Denmark (Boserup, Kopczuk and Kreiner, 2013) and Canada (Corak and Heisz, 1999) are 
0.117 and 0.134 respectively. Whilst we would caution about comparing transition matrices 
based on actual household income with our estimates based on occupational median wages, 
our estimates for the later cohort are clearly in the same ball park as Denmark and Canada. A 
caveat when interpreting our occupational wage estimates over time is that within-occupation 
inequality may additionally be changing. In the only other work we are aware of using LS to 
study mobility, Buscha and Sturgis (2018) present results suggesting a slight increase in broad 
social class mobility. Sociological measures of broad social class mobility need not align with 
measures based on finer occupations or wages, as demonstrated in Blanden, Gregg and 
MacMillan (2013). 
Panel B of Table 2 focusses on home ownership. Here there is a very clear and 
consistent pattern. There has been a large and statistically significant fall in intergenerational 
mobility across the cohorts – home ownership among children has increasingly depended on 
the home ownership of their parents. The correlation coefficient was 0.184 for the first cohort, 
but 0.312 for the last cohort. This means that for the latest cohort, children of homeowners are 
more than 30 percentage points more likely to own their home than children of non-
homeowners. This increase of 0.128 is strongly significant and very substantial. The log-odds 
ratio paints a very similar picture of a large and significant fall in mobility. Figure 1 shows raw 
home ownership rates for children and parents. This illustrates large shifts in home ownership 
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rates across generations. Those born in the late 1950s were significantly more likely to own 
their homes than their parents, but by the 1970s the opposite is true, with home ownership rates 
falling below 70%. Figure 2 shows home ownership rates for children conditional on parental 
ownership for all three cohorts. Perhaps the most startling aspect of these figures is the fact that 
for the first cohort, 67% owned their own home even if their parents did not, whilst this had 
dropped to 44% for the last cohort. While home ownership rates have fallen for both groups, 
they have fallen most rapidly for those whose parents did not own their home. 
Blanden and Machin (2017) provide evidence on home ownership mobility by 
analysing data from the two cohort studies referred to above. Using the same empirical 
approach to that used here, they find that the intergenerational correlation coefficient goes from 
0.140 for the 1958 cohort to 0.217 for the 1970 cohort. These are broadly similar to our 
estimates for the first two cohorts (though their estimates are for when the children are aged 
42) and point to a clear decline in mobility along this dimension. Our evidence across more
time periods, however, shows that this decline accelerates for the subsequent cohort for which 
no other extant evidence exists. 
The final panel of Table 2 reports mobility estimates for degree attainment. For this 
outcome, there is a clear difference between the change in the intergenerational correlation 
coefficient and the log-odds ratio. The log-odds ratio suggests that mobility has risen, whereas 
the significant positive change in the correlation coefficient corresponds to a fall in mobility 
over the period. This divergence is driven by the fact that there has been a very substantial 
increase in the share of the population getting a degree. For the first cohort, only 4% of parents 
had a degree and 11% of the children. For the final cohort, these figures had risen to 11% and 
40% respectively (see Figure 3).  
Figure 4 shows that children of degree holders are in all cohorts significantly more 
likely to obtain a degree themselves than children of non-degree holders. The increased 
correlation coefficient reflects that this gap has actually increased. We see this as a fairly novel 
and important contribution of this paper. The large expansion in UK higher education has 
actually, according to one measure, increased the link between parent and child university 
education, almost guaranteeing a university education for those whose parents received one. 
Children of degree holders in the most recent cohort now have an 80% probability of going to 
university, compared to a probability of approximately 35% for those whose parents did not 
attend university. The gap between the raw probability of a child getting a degree if at least one 
of the parents did have a degree compared to if they did not actually rose from 0.408 to 0.444, 
but the ratio of that gap declined. 
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Regional Results 
We next present results at the level of standard region, which coincide with the NUTS1 
classification. There are 10 regions in England and Wales, each with a population averaging 
approximately 6 million individuals. Tables 3A and 3B present estimates using our two primary 
occupational wage measures – the bottom-to-top tercile transition probability and the expected 
child rank at the 25th percentile of the parent distribution. As with Table 2, the first three 
columns report estimates for each successive cohort while the final column reports the change 
from first to last cohort. As discussed in Section 2, we expand the cohorts to include those aged 
8-17 when first observed in the census to give us larger samples with which to estimate more 
precisely at the sub-national level. We present the national results with this extended sample at 
the bottom of each table. The extension of sample does not dramatically change these national 
results. Figures 5 and 6 present the mobility estimates graphically, for easier visual 
interpretation. 
The data show very substantial and statistically significant differences across regions 
in occupational mobility. For the most recent cohort, the probability of moving from the bottom 
to the top tercile is 0.302 in London and only 0.167 in Yorkshire and Humberside. The expected 
rank measure in Table 3B shows the same pattern, with these two regions also at the top and 
bottom. When we look at the changes in mobility across the cohorts, Yorkshire and 
Humberside stands out as a region that has seen a very substantial decline in occupational 
mobility over time. Indeed, for the cohort born in 1954-63, only two regions (London and the 
South East) had higher mobility, whereas for the most recent birth cohort mobility is lowest in 
this region. This decline in mobility is strongly significant for Yorkshire and Humberside and 
is about three times larger in magnitude than for the country as a whole. All regions except the 
North East have seen a decline in mobility, though the picture is more mixed when looking at 
the expected rank and most changes are not statistically significant. Two regions in fact 
experience an increase in mobility over this period according to the expected rank measure. 
The results in Table 3B suggest that an individual growing up in the most recent cohort 
in London whose father works in a 25th-percentile wage occupation is expected to work in an 
occupation in which median wages are 7 percentiles higher than someone of an equivalent 
background growing up in Yorkshire and Humberside. This latter region contains many former 
industrial areas, including cities such as Hull and Grimsby, heavily associated with post-
industrial decline in the north of England. Parts of this region have in the past been synonymous 
with energy production and coal mining, and it is still home to Europe’s second-biggest power 
station.  In sub-regional analysis following this section we will investigate whether the region’s 
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low mobility rates are indeed driven by these ex-industrial areas. The other clear pattern in 
these results is that London has an exceptionally high rate of occupational mobility in every 
cohort. London is a large and heterogeneous city. In our sub-regional analysis we will inspect 
whether this is driven by inner London or by the expansive suburbs surrounding the city centre. 
It is pertinent also to ask whether this high mobility is reflective of a broader trend of high 
mobility in cities. We come to this in Section 5 below.  
In terms of dispersion across regions, both tables 3A and 3B show an increase in 
dispersion from the earliest to the most recent cohort. While London has remained highly 
mobile according to both measures, other areas have fallen behind. For the final cohort, those 
growing up with fathers in the bottom tercile of occupations in London are almost twice as 
likely to reach the top tercile themselves than those with fathers of similar occupations in 
Yorkshire and Humberside. 
Tables 4A and 4B and Figures 7 and 8 show the regional results for home ownership 
mobility indicators. In stark contrast to the pattern for occupational mobility, London is now 
the area with the lowest mobility and the largest fall in mobility. The intergenerational 
correlation coefficient for the most recent cohort is 0.381 for London, compared to the national 
average of 0.312. For the most recent cohort, the highest housing mobility estimate is found in 
Wales, which has a coefficient estimate of only 0.245. Looking at changes over time, all regions 
have seen a significant decline in mobility, with London and Yorkshire and Humberside 
exhibiting the largest changes. The same is true when we focus on the log-odds ratio instead 
(Table 4B), though here some of the changes are not statistically significant, and mobility in 
Yorkshire and Humberside actually deteriorates marginally more than in London. As was the 
case for occupation-wage mobility, we see that regional dispersion in home ownership mobility 
has increased over time. 
The fact that areas with very different estimates for occupational wage mobility exhibit 
similar housing mobility suggests that the link between these two measures is likely to be 
complex. It is immediately clear that patterns based on occupational wage mobility (and likely 
income mobility) need not reflect differences in housing mobility. We view this as another key 
contribution of this paper - that different measures of mobility need not be aligned when 
making geographical comparisons. We explore this further in the sections below using sub-
regional estimates. 
Results for degree attainment are presented in Tables 5A and 5B and Figures 9 and 10. 
Focusing on the most recent cohort, the ranking of regions in terms of mobility is 
approximately the same irrespective of which measure is used. Degree mobility is lowest in 
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London, with a correlation coefficient of 0.486 and highest in the South East, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.418. Yorkshire and Humberside again has low mobility on both measures. In 
terms of changes over time, the results depend more on the precise measure used. Areas such 
as the North East and North West which had relatively low proportions of individuals obtaining 
degrees in the earliest cohort have seen significant increases in log-odds mobility. Yorkshire 
and Humberside and the East of England show the largest decline in mobility according to 
correlation coefficients, and no statistically significant improvement in the log-odds. In 
contrast to the occupation and housing mobility results on dispersion, areas have converged in 
terms of degree mobility. The increased probability of obtaining a degree associated with 
having degree-holding parents has become more similar across regions over time 
Sub-regional Results 
Moving to estimates based on smaller areas, we first present estimates at the sub-
regional NUTS2 level, all of which have a population of at least 800,000 individuals. This level 
is an appropriate aggregation for producing maps. The downside of moving to lower 
geographies is that estimates are inherently less precise. At the NUTS2 level, each region 
contains several hundred observations. We present choropleth maps of England and Wales for 
the first and last cohort as well as the change between these two cohorts. As with the Regional 
results, for occupation and degree measures we use the extended (8-17) sample and for home 
ownership measures we use the baseline (10-16) sample.  
Table 6 shows correlations between all measures at the NUTS2 level. We see that 
alternative measures for each type of mobility are strongly correlated. However, when looking 
across types of mobility, for example comparing the two housing mobility measures with the 
two degree mobility measures, there is rarely any significant correlation. There exists a 
correlation between one occupation-wage measure and one degree measure. Given the high 
returns to degrees discussed in the data section earlier, it is natural to expect some relationship 
between these two types of mobility. However, housing mobility is notably uncorrelated with 
both degree and occupation-wage mobility. Areas which are successful in propelling under-
privileged kids towards degrees and high-earning occupations are not the same as those in 
which similar kids are able to get onto the housing ladder.   
Figures 11A-11C show results using the expected rank measure of occupational 
mobility. Darker areas have higher expected occupational wage ranks for those starting at the 
25th percentile, and hence higher mobility. There is a clear tendency for areas in the south of 
the country to have higher levels of mobility along this dimension. For the most recent cohort, 
the figures range from 38.7 for South Yorkshire to 52.9 for West and North West Outer 
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London. All areas in the region constituting Yorkshire and Humberside see low rates of 
mobility. 
One interesting dimension that becomes clear when looking at the sub-regional level is 
the difference between inner and outer London. The three outer London areas are the most 
mobile areas for the most recent cohort, all having an expected rank above the median. In 
contrast, the two inner London areas are amongst the five lowest mobility areas, with an 
average expected rank of only 41. This difference between inner and outer London is much 
less pronounced in earlier cohorts. Though outer London has always been the most mobile on 
this measure, inner London was above the national average for the first cohort and has become 
substantially less mobile. This echoes the results from Chetty et al. (2014), finding that mobility 
tends to be higher in suburban areas outside of major population centres. In Section 5 we 
explore patterns for cities using lower geographies. For brevity, we do not report separate maps 
for the tercile transition probability measure, but the cross-section correlation for the most 
recent cohort between this transition probability and the expected rank is 0.89 and is 0.74 for 
the change across cohorts. Therefore, the picture looks approximately the same if this measure 
is used. 
It is useful at this stage to compare our measure on occupational mobility that ranks 
occupations by their median wage with the alternative approach favoured particularly by 
sociologists that rank occupations by their social class. Social class groupings tend to focus on 
the skill-level of the occupation. We follow standard practice and divide occupations into three 
categories: Professional and Technical occupations, Skilled occupations and Semi-
Skilled/Unskilled occupations. For the 1974-83 cohort, the percentage of working fathers in 
each of these three groupings was 40%, 43% and 17% respectively. For the children it was 
47%, 39% and 14% respectively. For each NUTS2 area, we calculate the probability of moving 
from the bottom to the top social class in a generation and compare this with the expected rank 
for the same cohort. Figure 12 shows the scatterplot of these two alternative measures for the 
most recent cohort. There is a strong positive correlation between the two measures (0.74). 
This suggests that our approach is consistent with this alternative approach to “valuing” 
occupations. Again though, we would emphasise that our approach avoids the inevitable value 
judgements of assigning changing occupation groupings to particular social classes and avoids 
the significant problems associated with changing group size, and shifts in the composition of 
work over time.  
Figures 13A-13C present the sub-regional estimates for the home ownership correlation 
coefficient. Darker areas here correspond to lower mobility. Again, for brevity we do not report 
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the log-odds estimates separately, but the picture looks identical as the cross-sectional 
correlations are 0.97 for the most recent cohort, and 0.95 for the change across cohorts. As was 
clear from the regional estimates, for the most recent cohort London and Yorkshire and 
Humberside have poor mobility on this measure. However, for the most recent cohort, East 
Inner London has an estimated coefficient below the national average (0.276 compared to 
0.312). Once again, inner and outer London exhibit substantial differences. We see that after 
the London areas, Greater Manchester has the lowest housing mobility, suggesting a link 
between cities and low housing mobility. We explore this further in the following section. 
Finally Figures 14A-14C give estimates for degree attainment for the correlation 
coefficient measure. Several patterns are clear in the figures for the most-recent cohort. Similar 
to the results for occupational and housing mobility, there is a noticeable divide between inner 
and outer London. Inner London areas have the lowest mobility on this measure, with an 
average correlation coefficient of 0.558, compared to the three outer London areas with an 
estimated average coefficient of 0.425, below the national average. For the educational 
attainment of children born in inner London in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it really mattered 
whether your parents went to university or not. 
South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire rank in the top five areas in terms of low 
intergenerational education mobility. To put these numbers into context, a child in the most 
recent cohort born in South Yorkshire has only a 29% chance of getting a degree if neither of 
their parents had a degree, whilst this rises to 45% in West and North West Outer London. The 
educational prospects of those born to non-graduates really varies by the area in which they 
grow up. Interestingly, there is also substantial variation in the probability of attending 
university conditional on parental attendance, from 70% in Kent to 100% in Inner West 
London. The areas in which those from educated backgrounds are more likely to attend 
university do not coincide with areas in which those from less educated background are more 
likely to attend university.   
5. Correlates of Mobility
While time trends and geographical patterns of intergenerational mobility across 
England and Wales may be of interest in their own right, the deeper intention in generating 
these estimates is that they can be used to shed light on causal mechanisms. Understanding 
underlying mechanisms is crucial if we are to move from descriptive patterns to policy 
implications. As a first step towards this, in this section we explore correlates of our mobility 
measures. To do so, we use the lowest-level geographical estimates possible. This is necessary 
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to obtain a decent number of areas required for estimating even the simplest of relationships. 
But it comes at the expense of precision in each estimate. We follow standard practice 
(Saxonhouse 1977, Card and Lemieux 2011) and use regression weights which are inversely 
proportional to the standard error of the mobility estimate. This up-weights areas where 
mobility is estimated more precisely. We also exclude estimates based on very small numbers 
of observations (under 50), resulting in the loss of 19 of our 145 NUTS3 areas in the 
occupation-based regressions. 
These relationships are entirely correlational, and as such can be seen as the first step 
to understanding both the causes of differences in intergenerational mobility across areas and 
how intergenerational mobility can affect other outcomes. All the analysis in this section refers 
only to the most recent cohort born in the late 1970s / early 1980s. To aid interpretation, 
mobility estimates are standardised to have mean 0 and variance 1, and where necessary have 
been transformed such that higher numbers correspond to higher mobility. We use correlation 
coefficient-based measures rather than odds-based measures to maximize the sample size used 
to create each measure. 
Cities and mobility: The ‘London’ effect? 
The results of Section 4 demonstrated that London is often substantially more or less 
mobile than other regions, depending on the measure. A pertinent question then is whether this 
is due to the fact that London is a city, whereas other regions are combinations of urban and 
rural areas, or whether this is something particular about London. NUTS3 geographies are 
detailed enough to test this, as many cities are assigned unique NUTS3 codes. Figure 15 shows 
a map of NUTS3 areas of England and Wales, with city areas highlighted. We regress each of 
our mobility measures on an indicator for ‘city’ and an indicator for ‘London’. Coefficients are 
presented in Table 7. Something to be aware of when interpreting these results is that the UK 
essentially has only a single very large city, so we are inevitably comparing London to 
substantially smaller cities. 
The first key result from the third column of Table 7 is that high occupation-wage 
mobility appears to reflect more of a ‘London’ effect, rather than a broader city effect. The 
estimated coefficient on London is positive and highly significant whereas the estimated 
coefficient on City is negative and insignificant. This suggests that if one is hoping to 
understand the mechanisms driving high occupation-wage mobility, one must look at policies, 
populations and institutions of London rather than those of cities in general. These results also 
show that home ownership mobility is typically lower in cities, and exceptionally low in 
London. 
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Industrial decline and mobility 
The UK experienced particularly strong declines in manufacturing employment in the 
latter 20th century, which is thought to have devastated some communities. It was observed in 
Section 4 that occupation-wage mobility is particularly low and has fallen dramatically in 
regions containing ex-industrial areas. Next, we use our lower-level geographical estimates, 
along with external data on the geography of industrial decline, to assess this pattern more 
formally. Our external data comes from the Office for National Statistics ‘SuperGroup’ 
classifications, in which areas of the UK are divided into groups based on economic, 
demographic and historical characteristics. We define ex-industrial areas as those labelled as 
‘Manufacturing Legacy’, ‘Industrial and Multi-ethnic’ and ‘Mining Legacy’ areas. These 
industrial groupings are mapped in Figure 16. 
The first row of Table 8 shows that regressing occupation-wage mobility on this ex-
industrial indicator gives a statistically significant coefficient estimate of -0.56. Ex-industrial 
areas are less mobile in terms of occupations than other areas. This relationship is robust to the 
inclusion of an indicator for London. There exists no significant relationship between the ex-
industrial indicator and other measures of mobility. The mobility patterns found here are 
consistent with the US income mobility results found in Chetty et al. (2014), in which mobility 
was found to be low in industrial ‘rust-belt’ areas such as Michigan and Illinois. While of 
course much differs between these and other areas, the evidence here is consistent with 
mobility falling in areas suffering from industrial decline. 
House prices and mobility 
One might expect the relative prospects of buying a home for the children of 
homeowners and non-homeowners to vary with local house prices. In areas with high house 
prices, homeowners may be able to assist their children with the purchase of a home by 
downsizing. Children of non-homeowners will not receive such support. On the other hand, 
areas with high house prices are also likely to be areas of strong economic growth, possibly 
aiding those whose parents do not own a home. To test for a relationship between prices and 
mobility measures, we use data from the UK Land Registry on 1995 median house prices at 
the local authority level, aggregated to the NUTS3 level by taking a population-weighted mean 
across local authorities. 
We find a negative relationship between house prices and housing mobility, consistent 
with the first mechanism discussed above. This relationship is significant at the 1% level. A 
one standard-deviation increase in mobility corresponds to a drop of £3,641 in local house 
prices, relative to an average price of £54,000.  While there is then evidence of a negative link, 
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housing mobility is clearly determined by more than house prices alone. There exist many 
outliers such as Tower Hamlets, an area in Inner East London which has relatively high house 
prices and high housing mobility. Also evident from Table 8 is that house prices are strongly 
positively related to areas with high occupation-wage mobility. Much of this is driven by outer 
London, an area with high occupation-wage mobility and high house prices. 
Political voting behaviour and mobility 
The UK’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016 exposed a wide divide in public 
opinion on key political issues. As with recent political events in the United States, there were 
significant differences in voting patterns across regions. In general, younger metropolitan areas 
of the UK voted to remain in the EU, whereas older, poorer and rural areas voted to leave. In 
the media, this pattern has been linked to geographical differences in social mobility.  The 
argument frequently made is that some areas have been ‘left behind’, that people living in these 
regions see little prospect of improving their position in life under the current system, so are 
more likely to vote for radical changes to the status quo as represented by Brexit in the UK and 
President Trump in the US.  This correlation has been shown for the US in Rothwell and Diego-
Rosell (2016) but has not been tested for the UK due to the prior lack of regional estimates. 
To test for a relationship between voting patterns and mobility, we obtain publicly-
available data on 2016 referendum voting shares at the local authority level. We aggregate to 
NUTS3 and investigate how these shares relate to occupation-wage mobility. The third row of 
Table 8 and the scatter plot provided in Figure 17 demonstrate that consistent with the above 
story of ‘left-behind’ areas, occupation-wage mobility is negatively related to the share voting 
to leave the EU. The relationship is significant at the 5% level. Areas with low occupation-
wage mobility, such as the northern areas of Barnsley, Doncaster and Rotherham, tended to 
vote to leave the EU. High mobility areas, such as the outer London areas of Harrow, 
Hillingdon and Barnet voted to remain in the EU. It is clear from the figure however that there 
are some significant outliers. Several urban areas such as Hackney and Newham voted to 
remain despite having low mobility. It is worth noting that many of these urban areas changed 
(gentrified) substantially throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Interestingly, in terms of other 
measures of mobility, areas which voted to leave the EU had higher rates of mobility than those 
which voted to remain. This is particularly true for our measure of degree mobility. Again, this 
is partially driven by London being an outlier in both measures, however the result holds if 
London is excluded. 
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6. Conclusions
This paper presents the first evidence on the geography of intergenerational mobility in 
the UK using decennial census data. These data allow us to explore various dimensions of 
mobility and present estimates of both the differences in mobility across areas, but also offer 
the opportunity to map changes over time. In addition, we present some preliminary evidence 
that points to factors likely to be important in explaining differences across areas in mobility 
and how differences in mobility may impact other outcomes that we are interested in 
understanding. 
Our key finding is that across all dimensions of mobility there are stark differences 
across the regions of England and Wales. A national intergenerational mobility measure hides 
much of this spatial variation. In terms of occupational movements, London stands out as an 
area that exhibits high mobility – being born to a low-skilled parent does not stand in the way 
of moving into the professions to the same extent that it does in other areas. Ex-industrial and 
mining areas have the opposite tendency, with particularly poor results for Yorkshire and 
Humberside. By contrast, home ownership mobility points to a worrying trend for London – 
increasingly those born to parents who are homeowners are the most likely to themselves get 
onto the housing ladder. Finally, our educational mobility estimates point to an intriguing 
result. The mass expansion of higher education has dramatically improved the chances of a 
child from a non-degree household going to university. But this expansion has actually 
marginally favoured those whose parents have a university education, so mobility has declined. 
Again, Yorkshire and Humberside perform poorly in terms of educational mobility. 
These results suggest that it may be over-simplistic to think in terms of high and low 
mobility areas. On some measures an area may be highly mobile whilst on another measure it 
is substantially less so. Unless we are willing to make value judgements on the relative 
importance of various dimensions of mobility, it will generally be difficult to rank areas in 
terms of overall mobility.  
We also present some indicative analysis of correlates with mobility. London appears 
different than other cities in terms of improving occupational mobility, whereas it looks more 
similar to other cities in terms of housing and educational mobility. Ex-industrial and mining 
areas appear to consistently have poor outcomes for intergenerational mobility, particularly in 
terms of occupation. And, finally, these mobility patterns seem important for understanding 
political disenchantment and how it has risen over time. 
23 
References 
Black, S. and Devereux, P. (2011) “Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility”, in D. 
Card and O. Ashenfelter (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 4B, Elsevier 
North Holland.  
Blanden, J., A. Goodman, P. Gregg and Machin, S. (2004) “Changes in Intergenerational 
Mobility in Britain”, in M. Corak (ed.) Generational Income Mobility, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blanden, J., Gregg, P. and Macmillan, L. (2013) “Intergenerational Persistence in Income and 
Social Class: The Effect of Within‐Group Inequality”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 176, 541-563. 
Blanden, J., and Machin, S. (2008) “Up and Down the Generational Income Ladder in Britain: 
Past Changes and Future Prospects”, National Institute Economic Review, 205, 101-16. 
Blanden, J., and Machin, S. (2017) "Home Ownership and Social Mobility", CEP Discussion 
Paper No. 1466, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics 
Boserup, S., Kopczuk, W. and Kreiner, C. (2013) “Intergenerational Wealth Mobility: 
Evidence From Danish Wealth Records of Three Generations”, University of 
Copenhagen mimeo.  
Bukodi, E. and Goldthorpe, J. (2018) Social Mobility and Education in Britain: Research, 
Politics and Policy, Cambridge University Press 
Buscha, F., and Sturgis, P. (2018) “Declining Social Mobility? Evidence From Five Linked 
Censuses in England and Wales 1971-2011”, British Journal of Sociology, 69, 154-82. 
Card, D., Domnisoru, C., and Taylor, L. (2018) “The Intergenerational Transmission of Human 
Capital: Evidence from the Golden Age of Upward Mobility”, NBER Working Paper 
No 25000. 
Card, D. and Lemieux, T. (2001) "Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return to College 
for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 
705-746. 
Chetty, R., and Hendren, N. (2018a) “The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational 
Mobility I: Childhood Exposure Effects”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133, 1107-
62. 
Chetty, R., and Hendren, N. (2018b) “The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational 
Mobility I: County-Level Estimates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133, 1163-
1228. 
Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2014) “Where is the Land of Opportunity? 
The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 129, 1553-1623. 
24 
Corak, M. and Heisz, A. (1999) “The Intergenerational Earnings and Income Mobility of 
Canadian Men: Evidence From Longitudinal Income Tax Data”, Journal of Human 
Resources, 34, 504-533. 
Dearden, L., Machin, S., and Reed, H. (1997) “Intergenerational Mobility in Britain”, 
Economic Journal, 107, 47-66. 
Elliot Major, L. and Machin, S. (2018) Social Mobility and Its Enemies, Pelican Books. 
Erikson R. and Goldthorpe, J. (2010) “Has Social Mobility in Britain Decreased? Reconciling 
Divergent Findings on Income and Class Mobility”, British Journal of Sociology, 61, 
211-230. 
Heidrich, S. (2017) “Intergenerational Mobility in Sweden: A Regional Perspective”, Journal 
of Population Economics, 30, 1241-1280. 
Jonsson, J., Grusky, D., Di Carlo, M., Pollak, R. and Brinton, M. (2009) “Microclass Mobility: 
Social Reproduction in Four Countries”, American Journal of Sociology, 114, 977-
1036. 
Laurison, D. and Friedman, S. (2016) “The Class Pay Gap in Higher Professional and 
Managerial Occupations”, American Sociological Review, 81, 668-695. 
Rothwell, J. and Diego-Rosell, P. (2016) "Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of 
Donald Trump", mimeo 
Saxonhouse, G. (1977) "Regressions From Samples Having Different Characteristics", Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 234-237. 
Social Mobility Commission (2017) “State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great 
Britain”, UK Government report. 
Tan, H. (2018) "A Different Land of Opportunity: The Geography of Intergenerational 
Mobility in the Early 20th-Century US", mimeo. 
25
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS BY COHORT 
Birth Cohort Sample 
1955-1961 1965-1971 1975-1981 
Baseline 
Female (%) 
Age at baseline 
White (%) 
Parent homeowner (%) 
Missing mother (%) 
Missing father (%) 
Age of mother at baseline 
Age of father at baseline 
Parents have degree (%) 
Mother has degree (%) 
Father has degree (%) 
Follow-up 
Age at follow up 
Owns house at follow up (%) 
Degree at follow up (%) 














































Notes:  Statistics are based on the core sample of 10-16 year-olds at baseline year who were 
successfully followed up two censuses later and matched with at least one parent. Values 
correspond to means and percentages, depending on the variable. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  Source: ONS Longitudinal Study
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TABLE 2. INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY ESTIMATES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 
1955-1961 1965-1971 1975-1981 Change 
Panel A: Median Occupational Wage 
































No of Observations 18,355 16,125 13,163 
Panel B: Owner Occupier 
















No of Observations 43,427 44,862 34,771 
Panel C: University Degree 
















No of Observations 42,907 44,609 34,705 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 10-16 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Correlations coefficients control for sex, age and ethnic origin. Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for 
variables vary due to restriction to males for occupation-wage estimates and a small number of missing values. *** = 1% 
significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study. 
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TABLE 3A. INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATION MOBILITY ESTIMATES (TERCILE TRANSITIONS) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 0.253 0.251 0.237 -0.016 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) 
England and Wales 0.258 0.253 0.231  -0.027*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 8-17 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Estimates show the probability of moving from the bottom tercile to the top tercile. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% 
significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study. 
28
TABLE 3B. INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATION MOBILITY ESTIMATES (EXPECTED RANK AT 25TH PERCENTILE) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 44.27 44.60 45.10 0.83 
(0.98) (0.98) (1.09) (1.39) 








Notes: Each cohort are aged 8-17 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Estimates show the mean expected rank of sons in the son occupation-wage distribution conditional on the father being at the 
25th percentile of the parent occupation-wage distribution. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance, ** = 5% 
significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study.
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TABLE 4A. INTERGENERATIONAL HOME OWNERSHIP MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 0.154 0.169 0.245  0.091*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.029) 
England and Wales 0.184 0.217 0.312  0.128*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 10-16 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Correlations coefficients control for sex, age and ethnic origin. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance, ** = 
5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study. 
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TABLE 4B. INTERGENERATIONAL HOME OWNERSHIP MOBILITY ESTIMATES (LOG-ODDS RATIOS) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 0.838 1.006 1.080  0.242* 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.107) (0.145) 
England and Wales 1.050 1.168 1.355  0.305*** 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.035) 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 10-16 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS 
Longitudinal Study. 
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TABLE 5A. INTERGENERATIONAL DEGREE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 0.410 0.463 0.444 0.034 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.042) 
England and Wales 0.402 0.457 0.452  0.050*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 8-17 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Correlations coefficients control for sex, age and ethnic origin. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance, ** = 
5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study.
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TABLE 5B. INTERGENERATIONAL DEGREE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (LOG-ODDS RATIOS) 
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Birth Cohort Sample 











































































Wales 2.205 2.091 1.951 -0.254 
(0.197) (0.135) (0.152) (0.249) 
England and Wales 2.284 2.051 1.993 -0.291*** 
(0.042) (0.031) (0.035) (0.055) 
Notes: Each cohort are aged 8-17 when observed in the family home with at least one parent present and observed again after 20 
years. Standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: ONS 
Longitudinal Study.  
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Housing (coefficient) 1 
Housing (odds) 0.97* 1 
Degree (coefficient) 0.16 0.09 1 
Degree (odds) 0.12 0.08 0.92* 1 
Occupation-wage (terciles) -0.14 -0.18 0.26 0.13 1 
Occupation- wage (exp 25th) 0.00 -0.03 0.39* 0.25 0.89* 1 
Notes: Pairwise correlations. * signifies significance at the 5% level. Measures transformed such that higher numbers correspond to 
greater mobility. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
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TABLE 7.  ‘LONDON EFFECT’ VS ‘CITY EFFECT’ REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
Housing (coefficient) Degree (coefficient) Occupation-wage (exp 25th) 
London -.51*  -.07  1.16*** 
City  -.34* -.21 -.17 
Observations 141  145 126 
Notes: Values are coefficients from linear regression of each mobility measure on a ‘London’ indicator and 
a ‘City’ indicator at the NUTS3 level for the most recent cohort. Observations weighted by inverse of 
standard error of mobility estimate. Mobility estimates based on fewer than 50 observations omitted. 
Measures standardized to have standard deviation 1, mean 0 and transformed such that higher values 
correspond to higher mobility. *** = 1% significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: 
ONS Longitudinal Study 
35
TABLE 8.  EX-INDUSTRIAL, HOUSE PRICES AND LEAVE VOTE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
Housing (coefficient) Degree (coefficient) Occupation-wage (exp 25th) 
Ex-Industrial -.00 -.10 -.56*** 
House prices (£) -3,641*** 411 7,610*** 
Leave vote (%) .02** .02*** -.02** 
Observations 141 145 126 
Notes: Each predictor entered individually in simple regressions. Observations weighted by inverse of 
standard error of mobility estimate. Mobility estimates based on fewer than 50 observations omitted. 
Measures standardized to have standard deviation 1, mean 0 and transformed such that higher values 
correspond to higher mobility. *** = 1% significance, ** = 5% significance, * = 10% significance. Source: 
ONS Longitudinal Study, UK Land Registry, UK Electoral Commission, ONS Area classification. 
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FIGURE 1. HOME OWNERSHIP RATES FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS 
Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36. Error bars reflect 
95% confidence intervals. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
FIGURE 2. HOME OWNERSHIP RATES FOR CHILDREN OF HOMEOWNERS AND NON-HOMEOWNERS 
Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36. Error bars reflect 
95% confidence intervals. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
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FIGURE 3. DEGREE RATES FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS 
 
 
Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36. Error bars reflect 
95% confidence intervals. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
FIGURE 4. DEGREE RATES FOR CHILDREN OF DEGREE HOLDERS AND NON-DEGREE HOLDERS 
 
 
Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36. Parents defined 
as degree holders if at least one parent holds a university degree. Error bars reflect 95% 
confidence intervals. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
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FIGURE 5. OCCUPATION-WAGE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (BOTTOM TO TOP TERCILE) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 













FIGURE 7.  HOUSING MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 





FIGURE 8.  HOUSING MOBILITY ESTIMATES (LOG ODDS RATIOS) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 
Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36. Source: ONS 
Longitudinal Study 
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FIGURE 9. DEGREE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 





FIGURE 10. DEGREE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (LOG ODDS RATIOS) AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 




FIGURE 11A. OCCUPATION-WAGE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (EXPECTED RANK OF 25TH PERCENTILE)  





Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37. 
Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
FIGURE 11B. OCCUPATION-WAGE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (EXPECTED RANK OF 25TH PERCENTILE)  




Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37. 














FIGURE 11C. OCCUPATION-WAGE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (EXPECTED RANK OF 25TH PERCENTILE)  





Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37.  
Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 




Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37. Three 
social class groups are Professional and Technical occupations, Skilled occupations and 
Semi-Skilled/Unskilled occupations. Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
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Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36.  
Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
 




Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36.  

















FIGURE 13C. HOUSING MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) AT NUTS2 LEVEL, 




Notes: Parents observed when children age 10-16, children observed age 30-36.  
Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
 




Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37.  





















Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37.  
Source: ONS Longitudinal Study 
 
FIGURE 14C. DEGREE MOBILITY ESTIMATES (COEFFICIENTS) AT NUTS2 LEVEL, 




Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37.  













Notes: NUTS3 areas corresponding to cities highlighted in red. 
Source:  Eurostat NUTS3 classifications. Cities identified by 
authors. 
 
FIGURE 16. EX-INDUSTRIAL AREAS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
 
Notes: NUTS3 areas corresponding to ONS classifications 
‘Manufacturing Legacy’, ‘Industrial and Multi-ethnic’ and 
‘Mining Legacy’ highlighted in red. 
Source: ONS Area Classifications  
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FIGURE 17. OCCUPATION-WAGE MOBILITY AND  




Notes: Parents observed when children age 8-17, children observed age 28-37. Mobility estimates based on 
cohort born 1984 – 1973. Mobility measure standardized such that higher values correspond to higher mobility.  
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